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IMPETUS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
SERVICES
Gordon J Cloney*
It is a pleasure to be here. I thank our University of Georgia Law
School hosts for the opportunity to be with you. I am saying a few
words of background about an attractive proposition-a global effort
to liberalize restrictions, on the international trade in services. The
underlying proposition is that consumers and providers of services
should be able to deal with one another with minimal outside intervention. Certainly, official policy should not unfairly limit the commercial freedom that the parties to the transaction might otherwise
enjoy.
But first, what are services? Simply stated, services are invisible
products, in contrast to tangible products or goods. Of course, a few
services are embodied in a tangible medium. For example, the information contained in a computer disc. However, the essential value
is the intangible part. Some services are provided directly from a
source in one country to a foreign client in another country-" acrossthe-border trade". There are some variations. In a few forms of
across-the-border trade, the client goes across the border to obtain
the service. An example of this is a tourist or a student.
Other services are provided to the client through the medium of
a business establishment located in his, the importing, country. The
establishment is owned or controlled by a foreign, or exporting, service
company. This is referred to as "establishment trade".
To understand "internationally traded services", I sometimes find
it helpful to think of them in terms of the economic purpose they
serve; in other words, what they do. Here, there are three families
of services which meet three different needs in importing countries.
One large family of international services facilitates trade itself. Here
we have services necessary to move goods and people as well as the
newer cluster of services which move information around the world.
A second family consists of services that are needed by industry and
which the importing industry consumes as "intermediate inputs" in
the production of goods and services that are then sold as final
products. Intellectual property and the whole gamut of industrial
technology that is exchanged between companies falls into this area.
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A final family consists of services that we can think of as more on
the order of final products, and which are consumed by business
and the public. There is some overlap among these families of course.
Bear in mind that a service company may have products to meet
needs in each family. For example, an insurance company may provide
export insurance that supports trade. It might also provide reinsurance, which is insurance capacity provided to other insurance companies. This is an intermediate input necessary to producing insurance
for the public. Finally, it might provide fire insurance to businesses
and homeowners, a more final, or retail, product.
What is the basic trade issue affecting the international exchange
of services? Simply stated, there are a host of unnecessary, discriminatory interventions distorting the service trading process. These are
imposed, for the most part, by official institutions. There are of
course interventions in international service markets for accepted
reasons. Regulation, when needed, is one of these. Also, governments
intervene with international service transactions for tax, monetary,
industrial, and trade policy reasons. Trade liberalization in services
is an effort to eliminate "discriminatory" policy and practices which
distinguish between the domestic and the foreign service provider and
which competitively disadvantage the foreigner in a national market
place.
Why are we here today? A little over 25 years ago, United States
direct insurers and reinsurers found themselves being driven from
overseas markets by a wave of discriminatory policies. The discriminatory practices were of three types: (1) those simply closing a market
to the United States insurer, (2) those making it virtually impossible
to set up and organize an effective operation in a market that is
technically open and accessible; and (3) those that crippled the commercial operations of the foreign insurer if it were admitted and
permitted to organize. Confronted almost globally, U.S. international
insurers attempted to fight back. The industry discovered three things:
(1) not only were there were no international trade rules for international insurance, there were no trade rules for the entire service
industry sector, almost one-third of world trade; (2) there was absolutely no recognition among the service industries themselves of
common trade problems, let alone the need to confront them jointly;
and (3) there was no policy or structure in the U.S. trade policy
establishment or elsewhere abroad for dealing with the service industries. Thus, in the early 1970s the U.S. international insurance
industry found itself, quite innocently, in the position of having to

GA. J.

INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 19:2

do nothing less than spearhead the reform of the entire international
trade policy system.
It was necessary to cause governments and trade organizations
worldwide to focus upon the trade barriers that service industries
faced in markets around the world. 1 In effect, this dimension had
to be added to the traditional trade policy focus on the problems of
trading manufactured goods, agricultural commodities and raw materials.
The process took decades. While it is too complex to completely
recount here, 2 there were several key steps. First was a triggering
development in 1974. Congress passed the 1974 Trade Act authorizing
the executive branch to negotiate a reduction of barriers to trade in
services while providing exporters of services with recourse against
unfair trade practices. Thereafter, a handful of service industries, led
by the insurers, organized under the umbrella of the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce to promote the use of these provisions. A second step
occurred in 1976 when the U.S. executive branch "officially" recognized that services were an important, and often discriminated
against, part of U.S. trade. Third, by 1980, U.S. government offices
in the White House, USTR and the Commerce Department were
created to address the trade in services issues. Finally, by the mid
1980s, governments outside the U.S. came to recognize that the U.S.
call to eliminate trade barriers to services would not go away. In the
end they realized that the issue was equally as important to them.
As a result, we are today speaking at a time when progress in
eliminating barriers to international trade in services is moving forward on two fronts. One is the bilateral level. The past several years
have seen a number of countries opening heretofore closed markets
to U.S. service industries. On the multilateral level, the international
trade policy community is now discussing liberalization of trade in
services within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Uruguay Round negotiations. The GATT discussions should lead to
international fair trade rules under which a subscribing country would
ensure that service consumers in their national markets have access
to foreign-source services, or should force service providers operating
establishments in the country to work within a framework of both
non-discriminatory official treatment and competitive ground rules
similarly applied to the local service companies.

1. See Appendix D.
2. See Appendix E.
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The GATT service discussions are pioneering into an entirely new
trade policy territory. As there is no precedent, the negotiators face
at least three ground breaking problems in addition to the basic issue
of accommodating each other's trade interests. One is the sheer
intellectual range of the venture.' The negotiators face the creative
challenge of building a framework today to accomplish for trade-inservices liberalization what the traditional GATT framework set out
to do in the trade-in-goods area over forty years ago. A second
difficulty is the different views concerning the unifying commercial
principle upon which the liberalization structure is to be erected. In
other words, are service markets naturally open and free, with restrictions on them being an exception to the rule of openness? Or
are they more properly closed, with openness being the exception to
be granted by the state in only certain sectors? And finally, what
geopolitical scope is desired? Is the goal to set reasonably tough
international commercial rules to be subscribed to by key national
service markets with perhaps an eventual trickle down to lesser markets? Or is the goal a "global" international agreement with success
measured in the number of signatories, with the removal of barriers
left to the long term? These are three basic problems that must be
overcome by the negotiators in addition to the incredibly challenging
matter of deciding what specifics should be included in the agreement.
Now let me move along and wrap up these comments with some
thoughts a little closer to the topic of our discussion here today.
What are the prospects for a GATT multilateral agreement on services
and intellectual property? I would say that despite any outcome of
the GATT multilateral discussions, the discussions made will inevitably advance the world into a more liberal trading environment for
services. These negotiations deal with the problem of discrimination
in trade in services. They have raised an abstract idea, liberalization
of trade in services, to a "high ground". Most importantly, the
matter has gained recognition and respectability.
Fifteen years ago when we began working with this idei, the concept
was suspect and very much of a shadow issue. The high ground
belonged to proponents of sovereign discrimination who felt that any
challenge to its free exercise of distorting trade in services was suspect
and improper. Thus, even if not successful per se, the GATT negotiations are legitimizing non-discrimination as a standard that will
become a part of bilateral discussions and provide a strengthened

3. See Appendix F (model agreement).
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basis for recourse. So if we are unable to obtain a multilateral
agreement to force governments to change their discriminatory habits,
there always remains the alternative of trade retaliation. But, in my
judgment the negotiations will produce positive results. There are
also certain economic conditions, which I call the horsemen, that I
think are very important forces favoring improved efficiency in trade
in services. While relating to services, they are separate and apart
from the liberalization question in the GATT context.
There are four economic pressures forcing more open and efficient
trade in services. The first is closing service technology gaps. Major
service technology shortfalls, and in some cases outright service technology vacuums, are present in all developing countries and a few
industrial nations. Modernization of the local service sector must take
place lest it be a drag on the evolving economy of which it is part.
Foreign sources traditionally introduce new service products, technology and marketing know-how which is, in turn, absorbed by local
firms. The second pressure is privatization. Widespread official "insolvency" has placed clear limits on public sector resources. Thus,
further interventions by state enterprise into the provision of commercially available services is unlikely. This circumstance may eventually open nationalized markets. And at minimum, it drives
governments to build up their private service sector. Foreign private
service producers can help meet the needs so created. Rising consumer
demands, constitutes the third economic pressure. Client pressure
exists everywhere, particularly in industries and businesses that want
access to the "world class" services their international competitors
enjoy. They also want these services at fair-market price terms. Governments will wisely accommodate this basic industrial demand as a
matter of global competitive need. The final pressure is the global
service markets themselves. Virtually all of the key service markets
and the top companies serving them are already international. This
circumstance is a powerful force for domestic change in both the
official perception and local treatment of international service firms'
view that fair treatment for foreigners at home will assure a country's
emerging "international" service firms enjoy non-discriminatory treatment in the foreign markets where they must emerge and compete.
With these four draft horses of the marketplace dragging international trade in services ahead, the complementary U.S. push for
negotiated trade in service liberalization is not without some real
expectation of success. Yet, will the key Uruguay Round negotiators
find courage to thrust ahead toward a conclusion that is premised
upon commercial openness; that is broad in terms of the range of
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service trade discrimination addressed; that is prudent, yet not without
imagination, in providing flexibility to national approaches and timing; and that is modest in terms of "global" political reach? If they
do, the commercial ground rules for the already rapidly evolving
international service businesses will change, dramatically, soon, and
for the better.

